The following is adapted from some things I wrote for a lengthy email exchange I am having with someone regarding Catholic teaching, the notion of the "Natural Law," etc. It crystallizes a lot of things I've been thinking, lately, about how useful (or, rather, not useful) these sorts of apologetic arguments or debates really are in the end.
Sometimes arguments about issues get frustrating, because at a certain point it often seems to get confused about whether we are even arguing about a teaching objectively and absolutely speaking, or whether (in order to defend against charges of internal inconsistency used to "disprove" a teaching) I am just trying to defend the internal consistency of a point, knowing that internal consistency alone does not "prove" the truth of any theorem in the absolute sense because we are still basing it on certain premises and axioms.
Often such debates seem to become just people talking past each other because the two sides are, in fact, revealing different basic premises or assumptions, different "logics," and then going forward to prove the internal consistency of a position from there. However, to the other side, who doesn't even accept those axioms in the first place necessarily, this can feel like trying to prove the premises using their own conclusions (which would be specious and begging the question).
The truth is, very often in my debates or apologetics, I am merely establishing the internal consistency of the system's logic once the premises are accepted.
You see, what annoys me most about discussing these things with many people is not, actually, that they disagree. I understand that people disagree, and that at a certain point there is no "arguing with" them because at the end of the day axioms are, well, axiomatic...and it takes a certain leap of (at least natural) faith in any moral system (or epistemology generally!) to accept the basic premises.
For example, I'm coming to see that the "Catholic Natural Law" is definitely still very much Catholic. It's "natural" in the sense that it reaches conclusions from premises that are not of necessity supernaturally Revealed ideas (though Revelation confirms them). But those premises still have to be naturally accepted, and not everyone does. At the end of the day a syllogism can't prove the very axioms it is based on, and which axioms you accept really will depend on a notion of knowledge that ultimately will come from accepting or associating with a community of understanding (and without this, one ends up in perpetual skepticism or trying to synthesize an epistemology a priori in some Cartesian fashion).
There are some general arguments or appeals to certain human concepts that can attempt to get people to see their fittingness, but these tend to hardly be "universal." I had this thought while looking at a poster on the subway recently that has a picture of a puppy and a piglet and says, "Why love one but eat the other?" from some vegetarian group. Of course, someone like me will simply answer "Because dog meat is stringy and largely unavailable here, but I wouldn't be opposed to trying it in a country whose culture does eat dog." But the poster isn't meant to appeal to people like me (who have no ultimate aversion to eating dog.) The poster's "argument" is not some grand philosophical attempt to make a rational logical case against the eating of animals. Rather, what it does is appeal to the sentiments of those people who already are animal lovers, who treat their pets as practically people, as "part of the family" (we all know the type)...and then attempts to get them to generalize from this pre-existing "moral" instinct (which has perhaps never considered the "why" of itself or the implications of its own unexamined logic) then onto all animals.
In reality, we cannot just assume all people hold our basic premises and argue from there (however consistently). Rather, getting people to even accept your premises in the first place must be a matter of appealing to their pre-logical values or moral instincts (which will be different for different people or groups of people!) and working from there, in dialogue with their experiences, to show how these values actually do resonate with our notion of the Good within the community of the Church. So the vegetarian posters appeal to pet-lovers' love of animals to make their point for them. But for me, perhaps, they would have to tailor an argument regarding personhood based around something more scholastic, more analytic (because that is my fundamental "language" of conviction.)
This is part of my frustration regarding the Church's current "culture wars" pastoral approach which seems to believe that we can "impose" the Natural Law on non-Catholics just because it doesn't come from Revelation, just because its premises are not supernatural. Yet it still comes from premises, still comes from natural axioms that are axioms, and thus have to be accepted "unproven" in some sense. It was in this context that I said something like, "If the Church is worried about someone attending a Unitarian Gay Wedding primarily because it's Gay rather than because it's Unitarian...I'm not sure they have their priorities straight!"
So what annoys me in some discussions is not disagreement. Rather, I do get a little pissed when people try to argue against my/the Church's official beliefs with the idea that they are somehow internally inconsistent. Because this just isn't true. I think people can disagree with the premises all they want, and civilly explain why they don't find the premises fitting or whatever, and we can have an experiential encounter about that (and I have faith that, with enough love and patience and grace, the Catholic notion of the Good would eventually emerge and come to be appealing in such a "cor ad cor loquitur" dialogue.)
But to try to impose the logic implied by their premises internally onto my system, which is based on different premises...that gets me a bit fed up. People can say they question the premises, but it makes me a little bit mad when they try to argue against the teachings through some attempt to prove internal inconsistency (such as by bringing up infertile couples or NFP in regards to the teachings on sexual morality). These things are actually perfectly consistent relative to the internal logic of the system. Question that system as a whole, fine, but at least admit it is internally consistent.
However, I would say that, for dissenting Catholics, trying to salvage an identification with the Church or Catholicism, with certain parts of the dogmatic system, while subjecting certain other conclusions of that system to a logic and premises which are foreign to it in a manner that results in rejecting some of them...is, to me, rather a strange exercise. In fact, from the perspective of those of us who do hold to the premises of its own holistic inner logic (the logic that renders the system internally consistent and which leads to not rejecting any of it)...it is even sort of an offensive and frankensteinish "appropriation" of (parts of) the Faith which we hold dear, a cultural appropriation of symbol without substance, of dogmas and rituals without committing to or internalizing the values they represent (like some Westerner fetishizing the externals of some foreign culture in a shallow "fanboy" sort of way).
Starting with some logic or premises external to the faith system and then subjecting the faith to its scrutiny (and then only keeping what fits) is a rather odd idea to someone like me whose paradigm is to accept (as and by Faith) the logic internal to the system itself and subject all other systems to that (rather than the other way around). It especially starts to look suspicious when the conclusions one reaches are those that conveniently seem to allow living the sort of life one harbors an affection for living.
Of course, what many dissenting Catholics then try to do is claim that the logic they are subjecting Church teaching to the scrutiny of really is, in fact, the Catholic logic, or internal to the system itself. But I just have to look at that and say, "Hmm. There's a logic and premises that lead to all the official conclusions, and then there's various other sets of logics and premises that lead to rejecting some of them" and to conclude, by Occam's razor, that the former and not the latter is obviously the logic and premises most naturally internal to the system (because it reconciles everything).
And I think this goes along with what I was saying earlier about subjecting the Church's system to a logic or premises external to it. I find that invalid. To me, the Church has a system of propositions, and there is at least one logic that renders that system internally consistent. Whether that logic has been imposed on the system "after the fact" or not "as a rationalization"...is simply irrelevant to me, because the logic was never supposed to be the "source" of the validity of the propositions in the first place (especially not as regards Revealed truths, but even to some degree this also applies to natural propositions as well); it was merely meant to show that the propositions do not, in fact, contradict themselves intrinsically. That's all theology ever is, it's not supposed to "generate" or "derive" any "new" truths, merely establish the internal consistency of the old ones.
But the axioms themselves (even the "natural" ones) take a leap of faith, take a choice to identify with the community of those who accept them, and this probably requires encountering people experientially, not argumentatively.
Sometimes arguments about issues get frustrating, because at a certain point it often seems to get confused about whether we are even arguing about a teaching objectively and absolutely speaking, or whether (in order to defend against charges of internal inconsistency used to "disprove" a teaching) I am just trying to defend the internal consistency of a point, knowing that internal consistency alone does not "prove" the truth of any theorem in the absolute sense because we are still basing it on certain premises and axioms.
Often such debates seem to become just people talking past each other because the two sides are, in fact, revealing different basic premises or assumptions, different "logics," and then going forward to prove the internal consistency of a position from there. However, to the other side, who doesn't even accept those axioms in the first place necessarily, this can feel like trying to prove the premises using their own conclusions (which would be specious and begging the question).
The truth is, very often in my debates or apologetics, I am merely establishing the internal consistency of the system's logic once the premises are accepted.
You see, what annoys me most about discussing these things with many people is not, actually, that they disagree. I understand that people disagree, and that at a certain point there is no "arguing with" them because at the end of the day axioms are, well, axiomatic...and it takes a certain leap of (at least natural) faith in any moral system (or epistemology generally!) to accept the basic premises.
For example, I'm coming to see that the "Catholic Natural Law" is definitely still very much Catholic. It's "natural" in the sense that it reaches conclusions from premises that are not of necessity supernaturally Revealed ideas (though Revelation confirms them). But those premises still have to be naturally accepted, and not everyone does. At the end of the day a syllogism can't prove the very axioms it is based on, and which axioms you accept really will depend on a notion of knowledge that ultimately will come from accepting or associating with a community of understanding (and without this, one ends up in perpetual skepticism or trying to synthesize an epistemology a priori in some Cartesian fashion).
There are some general arguments or appeals to certain human concepts that can attempt to get people to see their fittingness, but these tend to hardly be "universal." I had this thought while looking at a poster on the subway recently that has a picture of a puppy and a piglet and says, "Why love one but eat the other?" from some vegetarian group. Of course, someone like me will simply answer "Because dog meat is stringy and largely unavailable here, but I wouldn't be opposed to trying it in a country whose culture does eat dog." But the poster isn't meant to appeal to people like me (who have no ultimate aversion to eating dog.) The poster's "argument" is not some grand philosophical attempt to make a rational logical case against the eating of animals. Rather, what it does is appeal to the sentiments of those people who already are animal lovers, who treat their pets as practically people, as "part of the family" (we all know the type)...and then attempts to get them to generalize from this pre-existing "moral" instinct (which has perhaps never considered the "why" of itself or the implications of its own unexamined logic) then onto all animals.
In reality, we cannot just assume all people hold our basic premises and argue from there (however consistently). Rather, getting people to even accept your premises in the first place must be a matter of appealing to their pre-logical values or moral instincts (which will be different for different people or groups of people!) and working from there, in dialogue with their experiences, to show how these values actually do resonate with our notion of the Good within the community of the Church. So the vegetarian posters appeal to pet-lovers' love of animals to make their point for them. But for me, perhaps, they would have to tailor an argument regarding personhood based around something more scholastic, more analytic (because that is my fundamental "language" of conviction.)
This is part of my frustration regarding the Church's current "culture wars" pastoral approach which seems to believe that we can "impose" the Natural Law on non-Catholics just because it doesn't come from Revelation, just because its premises are not supernatural. Yet it still comes from premises, still comes from natural axioms that are axioms, and thus have to be accepted "unproven" in some sense. It was in this context that I said something like, "If the Church is worried about someone attending a Unitarian Gay Wedding primarily because it's Gay rather than because it's Unitarian...I'm not sure they have their priorities straight!"
So what annoys me in some discussions is not disagreement. Rather, I do get a little pissed when people try to argue against my/the Church's official beliefs with the idea that they are somehow internally inconsistent. Because this just isn't true. I think people can disagree with the premises all they want, and civilly explain why they don't find the premises fitting or whatever, and we can have an experiential encounter about that (and I have faith that, with enough love and patience and grace, the Catholic notion of the Good would eventually emerge and come to be appealing in such a "cor ad cor loquitur" dialogue.)
But to try to impose the logic implied by their premises internally onto my system, which is based on different premises...that gets me a bit fed up. People can say they question the premises, but it makes me a little bit mad when they try to argue against the teachings through some attempt to prove internal inconsistency (such as by bringing up infertile couples or NFP in regards to the teachings on sexual morality). These things are actually perfectly consistent relative to the internal logic of the system. Question that system as a whole, fine, but at least admit it is internally consistent.
But, obviously, other people may have different axioms or different internal "rules" of moral logic, and at a certain point there is little one can do except to respect the other's opinion as at least internally consistent, but agree to disagree about the founding axioms and logical premises. We Catholics have to remember this too, as we are guilty of it at least as often as we are the victims of it.
However, I would say that, for dissenting Catholics, trying to salvage an identification with the Church or Catholicism, with certain parts of the dogmatic system, while subjecting certain other conclusions of that system to a logic and premises which are foreign to it in a manner that results in rejecting some of them...is, to me, rather a strange exercise. In fact, from the perspective of those of us who do hold to the premises of its own holistic inner logic (the logic that renders the system internally consistent and which leads to not rejecting any of it)...it is even sort of an offensive and frankensteinish "appropriation" of (parts of) the Faith which we hold dear, a cultural appropriation of symbol without substance, of dogmas and rituals without committing to or internalizing the values they represent (like some Westerner fetishizing the externals of some foreign culture in a shallow "fanboy" sort of way).
Starting with some logic or premises external to the faith system and then subjecting the faith to its scrutiny (and then only keeping what fits) is a rather odd idea to someone like me whose paradigm is to accept (as and by Faith) the logic internal to the system itself and subject all other systems to that (rather than the other way around). It especially starts to look suspicious when the conclusions one reaches are those that conveniently seem to allow living the sort of life one harbors an affection for living.
Of course, what many dissenting Catholics then try to do is claim that the logic they are subjecting Church teaching to the scrutiny of really is, in fact, the Catholic logic, or internal to the system itself. But I just have to look at that and say, "Hmm. There's a logic and premises that lead to all the official conclusions, and then there's various other sets of logics and premises that lead to rejecting some of them" and to conclude, by Occam's razor, that the former and not the latter is obviously the logic and premises most naturally internal to the system (because it reconciles everything).
And I think this goes along with what I was saying earlier about subjecting the Church's system to a logic or premises external to it. I find that invalid. To me, the Church has a system of propositions, and there is at least one logic that renders that system internally consistent. Whether that logic has been imposed on the system "after the fact" or not "as a rationalization"...is simply irrelevant to me, because the logic was never supposed to be the "source" of the validity of the propositions in the first place (especially not as regards Revealed truths, but even to some degree this also applies to natural propositions as well); it was merely meant to show that the propositions do not, in fact, contradict themselves intrinsically. That's all theology ever is, it's not supposed to "generate" or "derive" any "new" truths, merely establish the internal consistency of the old ones.
But the axioms themselves (even the "natural" ones) take a leap of faith, take a choice to identify with the community of those who accept them, and this probably requires encountering people experientially, not argumentatively.
19 comments:
I must say that I really like this post. In light of our discussions regarding contraception here and on other blogs, I think it brings much greater clarity to where you’re coming from. This, for example, with my emphasis:
I'm coming to see that the "Catholic Natural Law" is definitely still very much Catholic. It's "natural" in the sense that it reaches conclusions from premises that are not of necessity supernaturally Revealed ideas (though Revelation confirms them). But those premises still have to be naturally accepted, and not everyone does.
This is what I meant when I said in a blunter and perhaps less precise way that the arguments still came down to “because the Church says so”. In short, the axioms in Catholic natural law ultimately come from the Church’s interpretation of just what the axioms of the natural law are—axioms that may not be shared by all.
You also say, my emphasis:
Rather, getting people to even accept your premises in the first place must be a matter of appealing to their pre-logical values or moral instincts (which will be different for different people or groups of people!) and working from there, in dialogue with their experiences, to show how these values actually do resonate with our notion of the Good within the community of the Church.
Completely agreed—and I think I said more or less this at several points.
I’m obviously not the one you’re in email correspondence with, but I sensed, when you spoke of your frustration, that you might have partly had in mind my accusations of inconsistency on the Church’s part. Having thought about it, I’d like to partly retract and nuance that (which may require breaking this post up, so I apologize in advance). Let me start by granting that if one accepts all the axioms, including the concept of “moral object”, etc. involved in the contraception debate, then the Church’s teaching is consistent.
Where I would locate inconsistency in the Church is in the historical context. The Church’s teaching is that its teaching does not change, period. It may develop (although it’s good to remember that John Henry Newman, who wrote on development of doctrine, got in trouble even for saying that, until he won out in the long run), but not change. I would assert that outside of the essentials of Christology and Trinitarian doctrine as put forth in the Creeds, that many less-central doctrines have, in fact, changed.
For example, for the first millennium and a half, the Church taught that any interest at all was usury, and thus a sin. This is why the Jews were the main money lenders in the Middle Ages, and why the Templars had to develop an elaborate system of charging interest without calling it that (much like modern Islamic banking), and eventually got in trouble anyway. Later, in the 17th and 18th Centuries, the Church altered this to saying that certain types of interest were impermissible; and now, it seems like, to quote Noel Coward, anything goes.
Likewise, the teaching on religious freedom has clearly changed since the second Vatican Council. Many other examples could be given, but I’d end with sex: as I’ve pointed out before, many, many Church fathers are very clear that all sexual acts must specifically intend conception (thus disallowing even what we’d call NFP). The idea that sex in the infertile period might be OK doesn’t start to get tentative approval until the discussion in the ruling on the Penitentiary in 1853 somewhat grudgingly and with many hedges allows--not promotes—periodic abstinence. Then Casti Connubii, for the first time in history, puts forth a “unitive end” in 1930; and then after Humanae Vitae, you get active promotion of NFP. This, quite simply, is a change.
Just to point out that this isn’t just me, there are actually traditionalist critiques of NFP; and many schismatic Traditionalist groups (especially sedevacantists), as you know, make forceful criticisms of the Church for having altered doctrine wholesale in the wake of Vatican II.
Now I’m not interested in arguing this now; I’m sure you’d disagree with my view here. I’m aware of arguments that such “changes” are actually “developments” or specific statements applying only to certain contexts (the usual argument used, e.g., in regard to the Syllabus of Errors), or were never to be understood as infallible, and so on ad nauseam. I have followed such arguments in detail, and I have to say that in my view, the sedevacantists have the better of the arguments. Unless one is already committed to the view that the Church’s teaching never changes and never can change, and thus has a stake in proving otherwise, it’s hard to look at history objectively and say that no changes have ever occurred.
I tend to look at it in a more Orthodox manner. It’s interesting to note, as Aidan Nichols points out in his outstanding book Rome and the Eastern Churches (which I’d recommend to all), the Greek of that period didn’t even have a word for “infallible” as Latin-speakers understood that term. Yes, the Orthodox Church certainly believes in Divine teaching that is eternally true—they even have a feast day named “The Triumph of Orthodoxy”, and it was in the East that the Creeds were even developed! The thing is that the Orthodox tend to view Divine inalterability as mainly pertaining to matters of faith, whereas matters of morals and discipline are seen more in terms of concrete situations and the charism of the Keys.
For example: both East and West agree that Jesus clearly taught against divorce in no uncertain terms. The West would say that the indissolubility of marriage is infallible (at least by the ordinary Magisterium); thus the concept of annulment, which has become in modern times a farce by which ever more tendentious rationales are found to find that a marriage “never really happened”, thereby turning annulment into the derisive term of its foes: “Catholic divorce”. By way of contrast, the Orthodox don’t pretend. They acknowledge that the marriage is actually dissolved, despite the sayings of Christ. In some more radical formulations which I’ve read from some Orthodox theologians, they admit that the marriage can’t be dissolved, and that a divorce and remarriage actually is adultery—but that it’s Church-sanctioned adultery that is reluctantly and sadly offered in order to prevent greater disorder. This, as you may know if you’ve read Orthodox theology, is the concept of oikonomia--economy, or “housekeeping”—in which even stringent laws can be relaxed on an ad hoc basis by the bishops when the specific circumstance demands it. The Orthodox practice on contraception is much like this—it’s not seen as a great thing, but neither is it seen as an intrinsic evil that may never be used, either.
This seems to countenance sin; but I think it’s more honest. Remember, Orthodoxy never developed a just war concept, either. St. Basil, for example, while arguing that killings in war are not murders as such, said that returning soldiers even from a “good” war ought to be Communion for three years! In short, killing even in a “just” war, even if not murder, is still a sin. Which could once more be seen as “countenancing” sin; but I don’t really think so. The Orthodox view of sin as more of an illness which sometimes can’t be avoided and which is paradoxically sometimes (and paradoxically) even necessary is more psychologically and spiritually realistic to me than Scholastic folderol about double effect and such.
In short, to grossly oversimplify, the West tends to think in terms of a very broadly applied concept of infallibility which applies even to very specific situations; whereas the East tends to think in terms of an unalterable deposit of faith which is of Divine origin, where the big-ticket items (God, Christ, the Trinity, etc.) are fixed, but in which the derivative implications (war, marriage, etc.) need to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, what I’m saying is that while the teaching of the Catholic Church is internally consistent as it stands, it is not consistent with what it has taught in the past. Once more, I don’t want to get into an extended discussion of it, and I’m sure you’d disagree with my position here; but I think there’s a strong argument to be made for this assertion. The extended excursus on Orthodoxy was to sketch a way in which one can assert a broad infallibility to the Church over time without insisting that it never changes in any way or that every individual situation be pre-decided on the basis of very specific and “infallible” teachings.
As to the specifics of contraception, I will grant you that if one accepts the idea of “moral objects” and the idea that the moral object of the marital act must always be the kind of act that can conceive, even if conception is impossible, then the teaching is consistent. However, I want to argue that while axioms are axioms, some are more axiomatic than others. This is what I mean:
Consider: the Christian believes that all humans have equal dignity before God, and that that therefore they have equal rights to consideration as full humans regardless of their race, ethnicity, state of development, etc. This is why abortion and euthanasia are rightly condemned, for example. This equal and intrinsic human dignity is a Christian axiom. Now, consider a Nazi. His axiom is that Aryans have full human dignity, and all other “lesser breeds” have less, fit to be slaves; and that some—e.g. Jews, the handicapped, homosexuals—deserve nothing but extermination. These are also axioms—evil, despicable axioms—but axioms that can no more be “proved” or “disproved” than the Christian’s axioms.
However, as barbaric as the Nazi axioms are, they do have a certain evil logic to them. Even as great and noble a virtuous pagan as Aristotle believed that some humans were naturally born to be slaves, and that women were naturally inferior to men. One who observes the physical, mental, and spiritual diversity of humans could easily be led into thinking that some classes of people are “better” than others; and the Nazi view is an extreme and pernicious version of this. Pernicious and extreme; but at least one might see why they came to this conclusion, especially in the context of late 19th and early 20th Century anthropological theories that were not yet recognized as pseudo-scientific.
Now consider someone whose moral system precludes anyone from wearing blue. I ask the person why this is so, and he responds, “Because blue is evil.” We discuss and debate, and it comes down to “blue is evil” being an axiom of his moral system. Given that axiom the rest of his system makes sense and is totally consistent. Now, in one sense, axioms are axioms. However, I think it not unreasonable to say that this differs from the “humans have equal dignity” and the “Aryans are superior” axioms. The Christian axiom we accept as Christians—and versions of it are in fact widely accepted by non-Christians. The Nazi axiom is evil but logical in a twisted way. But “blue is evil”? It is weird, fatuous, and silly. I can see why a person might accept Nazi axioms, as much as I disapprove. Why someone would think “blue is evil” is beyond me.
So. Regarding the concept of the moral object, I have already explained that I don’t see how it really is necessary to moral reasoning. I’m not aware that any non-Catholic systems of ethics use it; and I don’t think that rejecting it forces one to be a consequentialist. As to the axiom that the moral object of marital sex is such that all acts must be the type that could produce conception even if conception is known for certain to be impossible to be in the same category as the axiom, “blue is evil”. While disagreeing with the concept of moral object, I can at least see and appreciate the logic, even if I disagree. I must say that no matter how I look at the moral object of sex in this context, though, it is as unintelligible to me as the assertion that the color blue is evil.
Now I’ve thought about this issue for at least two decades, and (unlike most Catholics, let alone non-Catholics) I’ve actually read Humanae Vitae and much of the literature, pro and con, surrounding it. I can respect where the Church is coming from, I can see its logic, and as I’ve said before, I agree broadly that a marriage must be open to life over its course (though I deny that this is so for every marital act, as did the majority report of the bishops convened by Pope Paul VI). What I can’t do is see any logic to the teaching on contraception, or accept the mode of argumentation by which one gets there, no matter how I try or how I look at it.
Now at this point I guess you’d respond, “Well, one must humbly submit to the Church’s teaching even if it seems wrong or unintelligible--after all, you’re not above the Church.” There is something to that. I think that’s what you’re getting at when you say (my emphasis):
And I think this goes along with what I was saying earlier about subjecting the Church's system to a logic or premises external to it. I find that invalid. To me, the Church has a system of propositions, and there is at least one logic that renders that system internally consistent. Whether that logic has been imposed on the system "after the fact" or not "as a rationalization"...is simply irrelevant to me, because the logic was never supposed to be the "source" of the validity of the propositions in the first place (especially not as regards Revealed truths, but even to some degree this also applies to natural propositions as well); it was merely meant to show that the propositions do not, in fact, contradict themselves intrinsically.
In short, the moral reasoning of the Church is but a tool that helps us understand the divine teaching of the Church. The teachings come from God, whether or not agree, whether or not we understand, whether or not we can understand. All systematizations are in a sense provisional and at the service of Church teaching; but Church teaching does not rise or fall on the basis of the merits (or real or perceived faults of) any ethical system. I think that’s a fair statement of what you’re saying
Now if I thought the evidence was strong that the Church had never changed its teachings, had never condemned people for things later permitted, had never done anything but progressively unfold the full logic of the teaching delivered once and for all to the Apostles, then I’d agree with you on all of this, and I’d just have to say that I was wrong on contraception even though I couldn’t understand how.
However, as I’ve described above, I do think that the Church has changed its mind on many (relatively subsidiary) matters. As I said, you’d probably disagree; and I think we probably both already know each other’s arguments here; and I’m not interested in a lengthy debate on that issue; but I think a strong argument can be made on the side I’m taking here. I might point out that I don’t take this side lightly or just to support my views on contraception—I’ve thought about this for a long, long time.
There have been, as you know, men and women condemned as heretics that were later rehabilitated. Joan of Arc was burned as a witch and canonized centuries later. Galileo was condemned to house arrest over heliocentrism, and Nicholas Copernicus published his book on his deathbed to avoid Galileo’s fate; but both were vindicated, and Pope John Paul II apologized regarding the Galileo case. As you are probably aware, the Catholic Church has reconciled on a doctrinal basis with the Nestorian and Monophysite churches, arguing that aside from the first generation of heretics, the said churches don’t really believe heretical things, merely expressing the Catholic truth differently—which would probably been a surprise to the various Popes since those scisms! There are even the beginnings of movements to rehabilitate Savonarola and Jan Hus, among others.
The point is that there have been many who did not feel, in good conscience, that they could humbly submit to Church teachings that they thought were wrong, nor that they could keep silent; and sometimes, such individuals have been vindicated (and sometimes, of course, they haven’t). Remember that Dante’s Purgatorio had the Excommunicated at the base of Mount Purgatory. When the poet expresses surprise that they’re not in Hell, one of the spirits remonstrates with him that not even the Church on Earth knows the true state of anyone, even an excommunicate.
In relation to this, I’d also put forth the Orthodox idea of reception by the people. We say we believe in what is believed semper, ubique, et ab omnibus; but we Westerners don’t take the “ab omnibus” part very seriously. As you may know, some of the reunion councils were accepted by the Orthodox hierarchy but rejected by the populace; and thus they were considered to be invalid. The idea is that sometimes the Holy Spirit, who blows whither it will, works through the people even in opposition to the entire institutional hierarchy. I think it’s at least possible that the widespread rejection of Church teaching on contraception may be such a case; though Latin theology would be very cold to such an idea.
In short, it’s not that I’m trying to “impose an external standard on the Church” as such. Rather, I think the Church, while broadly infallible, muddles through in fits and starts through history regarding application of teachings; and I think it took a wrong turn in Scholasticism broadly and in some of the ethical axioms it developed, in particular. If one considers infallibility to apply in the way the Church says it does, then there’s no question that it could have taken a wrong turn; but if one takes a different framework, this is indeed possible.
The last thing I’d like to say is that I think one should be careful in how one portrays “dissenters”. There are many such who do seem miraculously to have systems that give them all the answers they want. Many such haven’t really studied, nor do they understand, much theology or philosophy. I don’t think it’s fair to view all that way, though. Some of us are actually 99% in accord with Church teaching overall, and 75% in accord with the teachings on sexuality. Some of us have pondered and wrestled with the issues. If we were trying to get things to come out as we liked them, we’d have jimmied a whole bunch of teachings; but I have to say that there are many teachings with regard to which it would make life easier if I believed the Church taught what would be most convenient to me, but on which I just can’t believe it does. My own beliefs condemn me, and it would be dishonest to reject those beliefs for my own convenience.
Frankly, I’m not really satisfied with either side of the contraception debate. I’ve expressed my views on the Church’s teaching at length; but I don’t see contraception, even used for necessity by a married couple, as anywhere near ideal, either. I sometimes think that the complexity of sexuality and the depth of mankind’s woundedness after the Fall conspire to make any sexual morality seem difficult and unsatisfactory to us in this world. Having said that, I just can’t see my way clear to agreeing with or accepting the Church’s unequivocal prohibition in this area. If I am mistaken, it is my sincere hope that God will break through and enlighten me; or that failing that, He will forgive my obstinacy (I don’t see it as that, but I’m not God).
Once more, I appreciate the thoughtful post and the careful consideration and thought it provokes in me, though we may disagree. Also, I apologize for the large number of sequential posts. Not my usual way, but I thought it necessary to make a full and clear discussion of where I'm coming from--and of course, Blogspot limits comment length. Anyway, Happy Easter!
You're right, I don't want to debate this really, and do believe your views of "changes" are incorrect. Not even because some things weren't intended to be infallible, or were only incorrect prudential applications of broader principles that were true...but because I don't actually see any such changes.
Developments occur, sure. But for a "change" to have occurred, I'd have to believe that a given idea was wrong EVEN IN its own time and context. That we "know better now" and that the past was wrong. But I don't believe that about anything. If I think some things would now be different in our context, I certainly don't think they were wrong "back then."
If all interest is not necessarily usury today (and I'm not so sure), it certainly WAS back in the middle ages. If the Church thinks tolerance and the rights of conscience are important to emphasize in a pluralist society, I still think executing heretics was probably correct in a Christendom. Slavery was certainly abused, but a hierarchy of social classes with separate duties exists today too, frankly, and the particular form Class takes is just based on the economic superstructure of the age (and, not being marxists, we do not condemn the existence of class in se). Etc etc.
I am not about anything willing to look back and say "The Church was wrong then, but is right now" even if some things right for then would be inappropriate in our modern context.
Secondly, I think most moral systems actually believe in "moral object." Yes, there are many today that think a good object intended or achieved it all that matters in morality. But "virtue ethics" systems of the past have recognized disorder in the INTERNAL logic of goods, because morality is seated in the subject himself. Pursuing the desire for a good but then subverting the Reason of that desire is internally morally incoherent in terms of how it orients the will towards the good, and ends up making desire an end in itself and turning the will in on itself.
And, yes, my view of dissenters is that, unequivocally, that they are going to Hell. There's just no room for doubt there for me. It is foundational to my whole understanding of the world. Were there a Catholic State, I also think they should probably be executed.
If you don't like the fact that I think that you and those like you are [objectively; obviously no one can read the internal forum] worthy of death and of suffering an infinite intensity for an infinite duration, you don't have to interact with me! For better or worse, we do live in a pluralist society, and I'm not particularly working to change that as I concede in this very post. But I pray for all of you though.
If all interest is not necessarily usury today (and I'm not so sure), it certainly WAS back in the middle ages.
If all interest was usury in the Middle Ages (and I agree with you on that); and if as your parenthetic phrase indicates, you think that maybe it still should be; and if (as is clear) the Church by its actions does not deem all interest to be usury now; then the Church would seem to be in the wrong at the very least in prudential judgment, right?
On a different topic, you've said in the past that you are, in terms of hope, if not doctrine, sympathetic to the concept of universalism. It would appear from the current post that your views on this have altered, or that you're less optimistic, or some such.
And, yes, my view of dissenters is that, unequivocally, that they are going to Hell. There's just no room for doubt there for me. It is foundational to my whole understanding of the world.
I think it's somewhat sad that the idea of any class of people unequivocally going to Hell--or as you put it elsewhere, being "worthy of death and of suffering an infinite intensity for an infinite duration" is "foundational to your whole understanding of the world". Hans Urs von Balthasar, one of John Paul II's favorite theologians said as much regarding the negative response to his classic Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved?. I might point out that he was never condemned for his strong universalistic leanings, and would have been made a Cardinal had he not died. In any case, he seemed to see God's love as more fundamental than eternal condemnation, so much so that he thought it legitimate to hope that all ultimately be saved.
I still think executing heretics was probably correct in a Christendom.... Were there a Catholic State, I also think they [dissenters] should probably be executed.
Well, I have to say that's a rather abhorrent view which even very few conservative or Traditionalist Catholics these days would share; but it's your prerogative. We're obviously on different planets in regard to this issue.
In closing, I did not mean to give the appearance of hijacking the comments thread or posting excessively. Your post was a jumping-off point for some things that had been banging around in my head. Perhaps I should have put them up as a post on my blog, instead. I seem to have touched a nerve, as you seem a bit angered in your response, if I'm reading it right; and that was certainly not my intention. I can respect where you're coming from though I obviously disagree. I appreciate the prayers, even though you apparently deem me deserving of capital punishment, in theory at least; and I'll keep you in my prayers as well. The wish for a good Easter season was sincere, and I reiterate it. Having said that, I think we've probably exhausted everything that can be said.
"if (as is clear) the Church by its actions does not deem all interest to be usury now; then the Church would seem to be in the wrong at the very least in prudential judgment, right?"
I definitely think the Church could do a lot more to clarify the ethical questions surrounding credit, its creation and ownership, and to see how that applies to the modern financial system.
But I think, frankly, they've been as bamboozled as everyone by the bankers. They're allowing interest nowadays on the presumption that the money being lent is from deposits, I think, and that interest is paid to represent opportunity cost or whatever. That might be fair enough in principle IF that's how the current system worked...but that's not really how the fractional reserve system works at all.
However, I'm not sure if the problem is so much the interest as it is the private creation of credit in the first place. Once you give that monopoly to the bankers, I'm not sure whether they charge interest or not is anything more than icing on the cake for them.
"On a different topic, you've said in the past that you are, in terms of hope, if not doctrine, sympathetic to the concept of universalism. It would appear from the current post that your views on this have altered, or that you're less optimistic, or some such."
I am sympathetic to universalism. I believe we can have HOPE for everyone. As I said: "obviously no one can read the internal forum."
This is the foundation of our hope, that even when the "visible" is objectively sinful, that people are excused by subjective private factors between them and God.
I do have hope He somehow reaches everyone. But private hope and the objective standards of public Revelation are two different categories.
"I think it's somewhat sad that the idea of any class of people unequivocally going to Hell--or as you put it elsewhere, being 'worthy of death and of suffering an infinite intensity for an infinite duration' is 'foundational to your whole understanding of the world.'"
There has to be final justice. There just has to be, I HAVE to believe that for my own sanity.
Obviously, we hope for mercy for all. But, assuming there is no repentance...if people who spit in the face of God and nature by, say, advocating contraception...who set themselves against Ultimate Meaning (as I believe they do by definition) and make a mockery of the Good...don't wind up suffering forever...that's just too bleak a thought for me.
In fact, I'd go so far as to say that the assurance of the damnation of the wicked would ITSELF be heaven enough for me, even if there is no additional reward or eternal life for the good.
"Well, I have to say that's a rather abhorrent view which even very few conservative or Traditionalist Catholics these days would share; but it's your prerogative."
Murdering souls is worse than murdering bodies. Sometimes the only way to exterminate a bad "meme" that is spreading throughout the community...is to, sadly, destroy the brains that are its host.
I'd like to think in the modern world we could contain destructive ideas by simply putting people in total isolation (though is that really any better than death?)...but still: I think ideas are extremely powerful and therefore extremely dangerous things.
And this idea that somehow THAT power (more powerful and more dangerous than any physical power or danger really) is for some reason beyond the right of the State to try to contain or regulate or guard against (or that for some reason, resorting to even physical punishment or restraint is arbitrarily excluded as a means for controlling or regulating that power)...strikes me as just arbitrary and ridiculous.
In fact, I'd go so far as to say that the assurance of the damnation of the wicked would ITSELF be heaven enough for me, even if there is no additional reward or eternal life for the good.
Well, that speaks for itself. If that's what you have to believe for your own sanity, then go for it. I find it staggeringly horrible. I would suggest that you read the von Balthasar book I mentioned above, as well as his Mysterium Paschale. Aside from that, I guess, 'nuff said.
Well, mind you I prefaced that by saying that repentance and mercy was my first hope for everyone. THAT statement followed only on the assumption of cases where that doesn't happen.
And I also implied it wasn't their suffering in se which would be good, but the ordering of Divine Justice IN that suffering.
The Summa itself speaks of how the Just will rejoice in the punishment of the damned:
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/5094.htm#article3
Of which I'm aware and in which I forcefully disagree with St. Thomas.
Sorry for butting in here, but Aquinas tends to be misunderstood when we don't appreciate the nuance of what he's talking about:
"...A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly."
None of us would rejoice in the suffering of the damned per se, it is the justice of God we rejoice over. Even God does "not rejoice in punishments as such" - that would be masochistic.
"Slavery was certainly abused, but a hierarchy of social classes with separate duties exists today too, frankly, and the particular form Class takes is just based on the economic superstructure of the age (and, not being marxists, we do not condemn the existence of class in se). Etc etc."
That's an equivocation on the point though. Namely in that there were members of the Church from within that particular period (Given that when slavery is often employed, it refers to chattel slavery of a given period.) called the institution itself ABOMINABLE in the eyes of GOD. At least in the form (as you cited) that it took to itself. The problem however exists in the Church coming to acknowledge such, AFTER the fact as is the case with certain, and particular encyclicals. The Spanish had been condemned previously for their actions in the Canary Islands against those who WEREN'T bound to the Church, they then go to repeat the same in the Americas, and then a couple of hundred years later the Church acknowledges it as an error, whilst secular authorities attempted to curb it within that age ? Mind you, the Church acknowledging the error of that act goes back much earlier than the pontificate of Blessed John Paul II, and Pope Benedict XVI.
This again goes back to ecclesiology East, and West. Perhaps change may not be the comfortable term to employ, but shall we then apply "nuance" so as to make everyone comfortable ?
Yes, it's a favoured subject of mine, but it provides for a valid documentation of the "nuance(?)" involved.
Sicut dudum (1435)
"They have deprived the natives of their property or turned it to their own use, and have subjected some of the inhabitants of said islands to perpetual slavery (subdiderunt perpetuae servituti), sold them to other persons and committed other various illicit and evil deeds against them.... Therefore We ... exhort, through the sprinkling of the Blood of Jesus Christ shed for their sins, one and all, temporal princes, lords, captains, armed men, barons, soldiers, nobles, communities and all others of every kind among the Christian faithful of whatever state, grade or condition, that they themselves desist from the aforementioned deeds, cause those subject to them to desist from them, and restrain them rigorously. And no less do We order and command all and each of the faithful of each sex that, within the space of fifteen days of the publication of these letters in the place where they live, that they restore to their pristine liberty all and each person of either sex who were once residents of said Canary Islands ... who have been made subject to slavery (servituti subicere). These people are to be totally and perpetually free and are to be let go without the exaction or reception of any money."
Dum Diversas (1452):
"We grant you [Kings of Spain and Portugal] by these present documents, with our Apostolic Authority, full and free permission to invade, search out, capture, and subjugate the Saracens and pagans and any other unbelievers and enemies of Christ wherever they may be, as well as their kingdoms, duchies, counties, principalities, and other property [...] and to reduce their persons into perpetual slavery."
Romanus Pontifex (1455):
"The Roman pontiff, successor of the key-bearer of the heavenly kingdom and vicar of Jesus Christ, contemplating with a father's mind all the several climes of the world and the characteristics of all the nations dwelling in them and seeking and desiring the salvation of all, wholesomely ordains and disposes upon careful deliberation those things which he sees will be agreeable to the Divine Majesty and by which he may bring the sheep entrusted to him by God into the single divine fold, and may acquire for them the reward of eternal felicity, and obtain pardon for their souls. This we believe will more certainly come to pass, through the aid of the Lord, if we bestow suitable favors and special graces on those Catholic kings and princes, who, like athletes and intrepid champions of the Christian faith, as we know by the evidence of facts, not only restrain the savage excesses of the Saracens and of other infidels, enemies of the Christian name, but also for the defense and increase of the faith vanquish them and their kingdoms and habitations, though situated in the remotest parts unknown to us, and subject them to their own temporal dominion, sparing no labor and expense, in order that those kings and princes, relieved of all obstacles, may be the more animated to the prosecution of so salutary and laudable a work....to conserve their right and possession, [the said king and infante] under certain most severe penalties then expressed, have prohibited and in general have ordained that none, unless with their sailors and ships and on payment of a certain tribute and with an express license previously obtained from the said king or infante, should presume to sail to the said provinces or to trade in their ports or to fish in the sea,
...since we had formerly by other letters of ours granted among other things free and ample faculty to the aforesaid King Alfonso -- to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed, and the kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, dominions, possessions, and all movable and immovable goods whatsoever held and possessed by them and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate to himself and his successors the kingdoms, dukedoms, counties, principalities, dominions, possessions, and goods, and to convert them to his and their use and profit -- by having secured the said faculty, the said King Alfonso, or, by his authority, the aforesaid infante, justly and lawfully has acquired and possessed, and doth possess, these islands, lands, harbors, and seas, and they do of right belong and pertain to the said King Alfonso and his successors, nor without special license from King Alfonso and his successors themselves has any other even of the faithful of Christ been entitled hitherto, nor is he by any means now entitled lawfully to meddle therewith."
True these particular bulls were issued prior to the so called "discovery" of "The Americas", but they later came to be applied to the newly "discovered" lands.
From Inter caetara (1493):
"Among other works well pleasing to the Divine Majesty and cherished of our heart, this assuredly ranks highest, that in our times especially the Catholic faith and the Christian religion be exalted and be everywhere increased and spread, that the health of souls be cared for and that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself. ...we (the Papacy) command you (Spain) ... to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and residents and dwellers therein in the Catholic faith, and train them in good morals."
Sublimus Dei (1537):
"We define and declare by these Our letters [...] the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved".
In supremo (1839):
"There were to be found subsequently among the faithful some who, shamefully blinded by the desire of sordid gain, in lonely and distant countries did not hesitate to reduce to slavery (in servitutem redigere) Indians, Blacks and other unfortunate peoples, or else, by instituting or expanding the trade in those who had been made slaves by others, aided the crime of others. Certainly many Roman Pontiffs of glorious memory, Our Predecessors, did not fail, according to the duties of their office, to blame severely this way of acting as dangerous for the spiritual welfare of those who did such things and a shame to the Christian name.""
Compare 'Sicut dudum' to the content, and message of 'Sublimus Dei'. In like manner, read the context wherein 'Dum Diversas', and 'Romanus Pontifex' were issued, and for what reasons. Lastly, what happened in the 44 years between Inter caetara, and Sublimus Dei, whilst employing the context of the Valladoid Debates that would follow from 1550-1551 as well as Father Antonio de Montesinos sermon on August 15th, 1511. Futhermore take into account the encomienda system in place that spurred Las Casas in the period between 1511-1520 to seek a change in that particular system, and it's ill treatment of The Natives. Furthermore in 1541 when he convinces Charles I to sign, and put into effect the "New Laws", as well as publishing in 1544 "El Confesionario" after having become Bishop of Chiapas.
The question now stands, what would have happened had it not been for a few men WITHIN the Church, who contested the view of the time ? The Valladoid/Sepulveda Debates DO provide for a dramatic shift in our understanding of the dignity of men. Aristotle was WRONG on that point, and those debates vindicate such a position. There are more than enough politics involved in the canonization of Saints (Unfortunately. The Queen had to assent to the proceedings for St.Joan of Arc's canonization...), but what would say the canonization of Fray Bartolome de Las Casas (Who IS indeed at most Venerable/Blessed as declared by the Church.), and a few other men of the period do IF it were ever to come to fruition ? It would mark a dramatic shift in how men related to one another, as understood by the Church. I think it's a bit of a bogeyman to cite Marxism vis a vis a classless society in such a context, as that isn't at all the implication of such an argument. Rather, it's essentially an argument where the ends DO indeed justify the means, and that we have no authority to change anything within our respective societies. Sound familiar ? That seems to imply that human life, souls even are dispensible. What of the Chinese Rites controversy, didn't a change in policy close off the Gospel to many later generations, and as such IS the fault of the hierarchy for the state of the Church in China in this age ? Yet, the Church is committed (There was actually a letter to that effect issued, BEFORE the change in policy, to then return to the initially issued letter (Fickleness can be UGLY.).) to preserving the good, and doing away with the bad, what happened there ?
I shared this elsewhere on another thread, but thought it fitting to share here as well, given that ecclesiastical divorce had been cited:
http://www.pathsoflove.com/texts/ratzinger-indissolubility-marriage/
Lastly, as to the subject of hierarchy, while such is indeed acknowledged within any given society, it's what informs those structures that can be subject to error as it relates to man's fallen nature.
Consider this, while we read in the Gospels, the conflict between the converted Jews to Christianity, and the gentiles, there was already a hierarchy in place from the get go. Namely the Jews who had FIRST received the Faith, and later the gentiles. This was already present with the structure of the Temple itself (The courtyard at least.). The problem however was as follows, the Jews given their particular history would have for all intents, and purposes been rightful heirs to such a position, they employed it as a means of causing a rift within the Christian community. Ironically, had Judaizing in an alternate reality been a requirement, all would have been equal underneath halakha. Namely in that whether cradle born, or a convert, a Jew is a Jew, is a Jew (Ethno-religious endogamy is another matter.). Just thinking out loud here. But I digress. Anyway, it wasn't solely their particular relationship/history within the economy of the Covenant of old, in light of the Incarnation within the new, but what it meant to their gentile brethren. Namely that they would logically occupy a secondary position WITHIN the Church. That to this day STILL acts as a thorn in the side of many, with groups like say the Association of Hebrew Catholics, and groups that have a particularly Judaic history within the Church. It's not that all the Churches aren't equal inheritors to the Apostolic Faith, but that there are still particular implications in light of St.Paul's words in Romans regarding the natural, and wild branches. This essentially plays out all throughout history with the various attempts at immanentizing the eschaton through the conversion (en masse) of the Jews. While it is true that Christ called to Himself ALL mortal flesh in taking upon Adam, He came into the world, and took flesh from within a particular people. Whilst He shares in a most intimate way with ALL of us, as regards to our humanity, He shares even moreso with His firstborn.
My point above however, is that it was through oikonomia (Keys perhaps ?) that such was allowed. After all, St.Justin Martyr himself cites that in his day there existed Jewish Christians who were heretics (Ebionites etc.) whom we couldn't hold in communion, and those who whilst still observing the long were orthodox in their belief, of whom we could hold in communion (The Catholic Encyclopedia cites such.), not every Church Father agreed.
"But sooner or later the Gospel was also to reach the Gentiles, and then the delicate question must immediately arise: What was their position with respect to the Law? Were they bound to observe it? And if not, what conduct should the Jews hold towards them? Should the Jews waive such points of the Law as were a barrier to free relations between Jew and Gentile? To the mind of most Palestinian Jews, and especially of the zealots, only two solutions would present themselves as possible. Either the Gentile converts must accept the Law, or its provisions must be enforced against them as against the other uncircumcised. But national sentiment, as well as love for the Law, would impel them to prefer the first. And yet neither solution was admissible, if the Church was to embrace all nations and not remain a national institution. The Gentiles would never have accepted circumcision with the heavy yoke of Mosaism, nor would they have consented to occupy an inferior position with regard to the Jews, as they necessarily must, if these regarded them as unclean and declined to eat with them or even to enter their houses."
^^^
That right there is oikonomia.
What however IS curious, is that when later groups came to be converted, that same hierarchy was imposed upon them. The very hierarchy that the Apostles had ruled against. You know, the whole "We received the Faith prior to you, and thus we have a closer tie to her roots. As such, you are at our mercy." No one ever (per se) explicitly has stated such (Well...), but that is essentially what happened in practice. What happened to consistency ?
" St. Justin (about 140) distinguishes two kinds of Jewish Christians: those who observe the Law of Moses, but do not require its observance of others — with these he would hold communion, though in this all his contemporaries did not agree with him — and those who believe the Mosaic Law to be obligatory on all, whom he considers heretics (Dialogue with Trypho 47)."
^^^
This is the portion I had in mind as regards to some of the Fathers, who viewed such as breaking with Church unity.
Sometimes, I do entertain the alternative. Where the Jews would have accepted Christ, and He would have reigned from Jerusalem, with Rome beneath Israel/The Holy Land, instead of the other way around. After all, just as such came about as a result of their rejecting their place within the Covenant, beneath the economy of the Incarnation, to the benefit of the Gentiles, St.Paul affirms for us, that it's nothing to boast over either. ;-) (He's pretty bawss for that.)
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