As I promised in my last post, I'd like to summarize Catholic teaching on grace and predestination in light of Fr. Most's solution on the topic, as he proposed in his book "Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions," which solution he summarized in this article.
Perhaps the best way to start such a discussion is to remind people of the basic principles of Catholic teaching on these subjects, which can be basically divided into two "poles" around which various attempted solutions throughout history have revolved. Fr. Most compares them to two points on the edge of a circle and trying to draw a line through each that would also hit the center of the circle.
The first ideas is the primacy of grace, the infallibility of efficacious grace, and associated with this the absolute sovereignty of God and predestination. Many people associate the word "predestination" with Calvinism, but in reality any religion with a coherent conception of God must admit some sort of predestination. God is omniscient and omnipotent; He foresees all of history, including the choices of free creatures and their final destinations. And, furthermore, He is sovereign over all history, everything that happens He positively confirms by decree of His will, or it wouldn't happen.
Calvinism only involves a very specific form of predestination, namely double positive unconditional predestination (I will discuss the infralapsarian vs supralapsarian varieties in another post). This post is going to involve a lot of over-simplification of the other positions, but Calvinism basically means that God arbitrarily decides to save some and damn others from all eternity. Some people would find this very cold, a cruel, capricious view of God, and indeed it is, God seemingly creating people just to damn them. But there was an understandable motive behind it, namely trying to avoid the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian idea that we can merit or earn our salvation in anyway.
The other concept, which some see as opposed to the first, is that of free will, of cooperation with grace. Arminianism is a soteriological heresy (held by most of the non-Calvinist Protestant groups) that is in some ways the opposite of Calvinism, teaching that God predestines in consideration of merit. This too is wrong because, while avoiding the seeming cruelty of God in Calvinism, it also tends towards a Semi-Pelagianism by giving people's merit (or at least non-rejection of grace) a causative role in salvation, something which is impossible: the agency in salvation must be attributed 100% to God alone.
This conflict in theology was, for a long time, due to the (mistaken) notion that, if God reprobated based on demerit, he must also elect based on merit but, on the other hand, if he elected without consideration of merit, reprobation must likewise be without such consideration, even though Catholic doctrine on the issue seemed to imply that election was unconditional, but reprobation was conditional.
Theologians had a hard time seeing how both could be true, thought that election and reprobation were "two sides of the same coin" and both had to be determined the same way. This let to quite an impasse in theology between the Thomist (Dominican) school and the Molinist (Jesuit) school, the Thomist leaning more towards Calvinism and an emphasis on God's sovereignty, the Molinist more towards Arminianism and an emphasis on free will. Both have some interesting points, but neither is perfect, basically attempting to put square pegs into round holes and vice versa. At one point during the Counter-Reformation a Pope held a debate between the two schools to decide the point, but decided neither was satisfactory and allowed both to continue, establishing a sort of status quo truce that lasted several centuries.
Fr. Most's solution, however, shows that the causation of election and reprobation can be separated. He proposes three stages to the logical order of causation in God's eternal decrees:
1) God wills the salvation of all...
2) unless they reject His grace; these are reprobate,
3) those left are elect, but not because of their own merit, nor even because of their non-rejection, but because they were in step 1 already.
An analogy might be helpful. Imagine a teacher writes on a blackboard: "AVE MARIA GRATIA PLENA" as part of a lesson on prayers. Later in the day, as part of a lesson on letters, he erases the vowels, leaving "V MR GRT PLN" written on the board. Now, it could be asked, why are those letters on the board? Some people might answer "because they're consonants," or "because they're not vowels," but they would be incorrect. That's like saying I'm sitting here writing this "because I'm not dead," a negative like that cannot be a cause. The reason the letters are on the board is because they were there as part of the first lesson on prayer. So were the vowels, initially, but they got erased. To say they're there because they're consonants is like saying they're there "because they weren't erased," which is simply tautological.
This "subtractive" view of predestination, starting with God's universal salvific will, seems to resolve all the problems that come with the previous assumption that predestination was an "additive" process whereby God chose some to include in salvation (either arbitrarily or based on merit) and left "the rest" to hell as the default. In Fr. Most's solution, God's first loving act in the process is to make salvation the default, and it is the reprobate who are then excluded (due to their sin)...a notion I think squares much better with our notion of a loving God and His purposes in creating mankind.
Fr. Most points out how this fits better with the language of "inheritance" that the Bible often uses when discussing salvation. For children, inheritance is the default, from their father's love...they don't need to earn their inheritance, there is nothing they could do to earn it if they father hadn't desired to give it in the first place. But, really bad children can be disinherited, they can lose their inheritance. But that doesn't imply that the other children get their inheritance "because they were good," nor even "because they were not bad." Rather, they get it since the father willed it prior to any such considerations of their own behavior, even if they can lose it because of their bad behavior.
So election can be unconditional of merit even while reprobration is conditional on sin. This fits the Catholic doctrine on the issue perfectly, which essentially teach that election is unconditional but reprobation is conditional. Double predestination: election unconditional, but reprobation conditional (unlike Calvinism which is double unconditional).
Some theologians attempted to square what they thought was impossible by distinguishing between "positive" and "negative" reprobation. They tried to argue that Catholics could believe in double unconditional predestination as long as the reprobation was "negative" (ie, wills them "not to enter heaven") rather than positive (ie, willing them "to go to hell"). But this solution had lots of problems. The two concepts being equivalent in their system, it is a legalistic distinction to try to pretend that God could see any difference. Election and reprobation are almost certainly both positive, the fudging whereby God merely wills non-heaven instead of positively predestining to hell is an intellectual cop-out.
But Fr. Most's solution, whereby predestination, though positive in both cases, is "subtractive" from an initial universal salvific will is very satisfying intellectually, and recent writings from the Popes seem to indicate that it has been implicitly adopted by the Church as the best solution to reconciling dogmas that many saw as hard to reconcile.
I would go further and apply the same principle to the question of grace and free will in the present moment, something Fr. Most hints at, though doesn't develop as explicitly as the question of predestination.
We must remember certain Catholic dogmas on the operation of grace, such as:
Perhaps the best way to start such a discussion is to remind people of the basic principles of Catholic teaching on these subjects, which can be basically divided into two "poles" around which various attempted solutions throughout history have revolved. Fr. Most compares them to two points on the edge of a circle and trying to draw a line through each that would also hit the center of the circle.
The first ideas is the primacy of grace, the infallibility of efficacious grace, and associated with this the absolute sovereignty of God and predestination. Many people associate the word "predestination" with Calvinism, but in reality any religion with a coherent conception of God must admit some sort of predestination. God is omniscient and omnipotent; He foresees all of history, including the choices of free creatures and their final destinations. And, furthermore, He is sovereign over all history, everything that happens He positively confirms by decree of His will, or it wouldn't happen.
Calvinism only involves a very specific form of predestination, namely double positive unconditional predestination (I will discuss the infralapsarian vs supralapsarian varieties in another post). This post is going to involve a lot of over-simplification of the other positions, but Calvinism basically means that God arbitrarily decides to save some and damn others from all eternity. Some people would find this very cold, a cruel, capricious view of God, and indeed it is, God seemingly creating people just to damn them. But there was an understandable motive behind it, namely trying to avoid the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian idea that we can merit or earn our salvation in anyway.
The other concept, which some see as opposed to the first, is that of free will, of cooperation with grace. Arminianism is a soteriological heresy (held by most of the non-Calvinist Protestant groups) that is in some ways the opposite of Calvinism, teaching that God predestines in consideration of merit. This too is wrong because, while avoiding the seeming cruelty of God in Calvinism, it also tends towards a Semi-Pelagianism by giving people's merit (or at least non-rejection of grace) a causative role in salvation, something which is impossible: the agency in salvation must be attributed 100% to God alone.
This conflict in theology was, for a long time, due to the (mistaken) notion that, if God reprobated based on demerit, he must also elect based on merit but, on the other hand, if he elected without consideration of merit, reprobation must likewise be without such consideration, even though Catholic doctrine on the issue seemed to imply that election was unconditional, but reprobation was conditional.
Theologians had a hard time seeing how both could be true, thought that election and reprobation were "two sides of the same coin" and both had to be determined the same way. This let to quite an impasse in theology between the Thomist (Dominican) school and the Molinist (Jesuit) school, the Thomist leaning more towards Calvinism and an emphasis on God's sovereignty, the Molinist more towards Arminianism and an emphasis on free will. Both have some interesting points, but neither is perfect, basically attempting to put square pegs into round holes and vice versa. At one point during the Counter-Reformation a Pope held a debate between the two schools to decide the point, but decided neither was satisfactory and allowed both to continue, establishing a sort of status quo truce that lasted several centuries.
Fr. Most's solution, however, shows that the causation of election and reprobation can be separated. He proposes three stages to the logical order of causation in God's eternal decrees:
1) God wills the salvation of all...
2) unless they reject His grace; these are reprobate,
3) those left are elect, but not because of their own merit, nor even because of their non-rejection, but because they were in step 1 already.
An analogy might be helpful. Imagine a teacher writes on a blackboard: "AVE MARIA GRATIA PLENA" as part of a lesson on prayers. Later in the day, as part of a lesson on letters, he erases the vowels, leaving "V MR GRT PLN" written on the board. Now, it could be asked, why are those letters on the board? Some people might answer "because they're consonants," or "because they're not vowels," but they would be incorrect. That's like saying I'm sitting here writing this "because I'm not dead," a negative like that cannot be a cause. The reason the letters are on the board is because they were there as part of the first lesson on prayer. So were the vowels, initially, but they got erased. To say they're there because they're consonants is like saying they're there "because they weren't erased," which is simply tautological.
This "subtractive" view of predestination, starting with God's universal salvific will, seems to resolve all the problems that come with the previous assumption that predestination was an "additive" process whereby God chose some to include in salvation (either arbitrarily or based on merit) and left "the rest" to hell as the default. In Fr. Most's solution, God's first loving act in the process is to make salvation the default, and it is the reprobate who are then excluded (due to their sin)...a notion I think squares much better with our notion of a loving God and His purposes in creating mankind.
Fr. Most points out how this fits better with the language of "inheritance" that the Bible often uses when discussing salvation. For children, inheritance is the default, from their father's love...they don't need to earn their inheritance, there is nothing they could do to earn it if they father hadn't desired to give it in the first place. But, really bad children can be disinherited, they can lose their inheritance. But that doesn't imply that the other children get their inheritance "because they were good," nor even "because they were not bad." Rather, they get it since the father willed it prior to any such considerations of their own behavior, even if they can lose it because of their bad behavior.
So election can be unconditional of merit even while reprobration is conditional on sin. This fits the Catholic doctrine on the issue perfectly, which essentially teach that election is unconditional but reprobation is conditional. Double predestination: election unconditional, but reprobation conditional (unlike Calvinism which is double unconditional).
Some theologians attempted to square what they thought was impossible by distinguishing between "positive" and "negative" reprobation. They tried to argue that Catholics could believe in double unconditional predestination as long as the reprobation was "negative" (ie, wills them "not to enter heaven") rather than positive (ie, willing them "to go to hell"). But this solution had lots of problems. The two concepts being equivalent in their system, it is a legalistic distinction to try to pretend that God could see any difference. Election and reprobation are almost certainly both positive, the fudging whereby God merely wills non-heaven instead of positively predestining to hell is an intellectual cop-out.
But Fr. Most's solution, whereby predestination, though positive in both cases, is "subtractive" from an initial universal salvific will is very satisfying intellectually, and recent writings from the Popes seem to indicate that it has been implicitly adopted by the Church as the best solution to reconciling dogmas that many saw as hard to reconcile.
I would go further and apply the same principle to the question of grace and free will in the present moment, something Fr. Most hints at, though doesn't develop as explicitly as the question of predestination.
We must remember certain Catholic dogmas on the operation of grace, such as:
- There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will. (De fide.)
- There is a supernatural influence of God in the faculties of the soul which coincides in time with man's free act of will. (De fide.)
- Grace cannot be merited by natural works either de condigno or de congruo. (De fide.)
- Man of himself cannot acquire any positive disposition for grace. (Sent. certa.)
- Despite men's sins God truly and earnestly desires the salvation of all men. (Sent. fidei proxima.)
- God gives all the just sufficient grace (gratia proxime vel remote sufficiens) for the observation of the Divine Commandments. (De fide.)
- God gives all the faithful who are sinners sufficent grace (gratia saltem remote sufficiens) for conversion. (Sent. communis.)
- God gives all innocent unbelievers (infideles negativi) suffienct grace to achieve eternal salvation. (Sent. certa.)
- God, by His Eternal Resolve of Will, has predetermined certain men to eternal blessedness. (De fide.)
- God, by an Eternal Resolve of His Will, predestines certain men, on account of their foreseen sins, to eternal rejection. (De fide.)
- The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible. (De fide.)
- There is a grace which is truly sufficient and yet remains inefficacious (gratia vere et mere sufficiens.) (De fide.)
The problem, similar to that of predestination, arises in that "efficacious grace" is taught to be infallible, and yet not irresistible. "Efficacious grace" is, by definition, efficacious; it by nature produces its salutatory effect, and yet somehow it does not coerce the will. And merely sufficient grace can remain inefficacious, so what good is it? Besides as a technicality to say that God didn't leave the person without anything, what exactly did it do concretely if it remains merely sufficient?
Again to oversimplify: the strict Thomists (including, apparently, Garrigou-Lagrange) seem to view mankind as the "massa damnata" and basically turn "free will" into something of an illusion, with efficacious grace being basically an arbitrary gift to a chosen few, and merely sufficient being basically just a technicality so that we don't have to turn God into some sort of monster. Whereas the Molinists are required to turn to complex appeals to God's "scientia media" (His knowledge of what someone would choose if put in certain circumstances) in order to deny efficacious grace to those who "would reject it anyway" in order to save the claim that it is infallible. Again, neither solution is terribly satisfying.
However, the "subtractive" method of Fr. Most helps to explain the relationship between sufficient grace and efficacious grace, and the relation of both to free will.
The idea had long been mentioned that efficacious grace is simply sufficient grace cooperated with or non-resisted, that efficacious grace is simply the name for sufficient grace that has been enacted. However, the problem is that cooperation itself has to also be attributed to God's agency. Even non-resistance to grace would have to be a grace, which for a long time seemed to merely move the causation back a step (ie, "turtles all the way down"). Now, for a merely objectively naturally morally good action, grace would not be needed, but for it to be of any salutary effect for the soul subjectively, God's supernatural agency must be present.
However, if sufficient grace is identified with the ability to non-resist, then things seem rather reconciled. Fallen humanity, without grace, is basically a massa damnata which can only resist God, its natural "default" is resistance. But, God gives everyone sufficient grace, changing their default, in practice, to non-resistance (but only due to sufficient grace). Then, if people still make an active choice to resist (which they are free to) then they sin, or at least do not enact the grace (ie, an "imperfection"). Whereas, if they do not make such an active choice to resist, then the grace (now coinciding with the free act of the will) is efficacious and so infallibly achieves its result, directing the will in a salutary direction while giving God all the agency (since even the non-resistance was a grace: the "sufficient grace" preceding the free act of the will).
Basically, it's the same principle as the predestination: merit is unconditional (everyone is given sufficient grace freely by God prior to any consideration of their own choice), whereas sin and imperfection is conditional on active resistance, on active rejection of that grace.
Basically, it is an application of the principles of election and reprobation to each individual act of the will. Rather than just considering the final eternal destination of all people, this applies it to each individual act. For God not only arranges or predestines the final destination as regards salvation for each person, but also each act of the will along the way, and yet leaving freedom just as meaningfully real.
And, once again, the best solution is a "subtractive" one; namely, God first wills every act of the will ever made by any person to be a salutary one as the default, a cooperation with His actual grace, and demonstrates this by giving everyone the sufficient grace to accomplish it; making the default of their will non-resistance to His. But then He excludes those acts where there is active resistance nevertheless. Those acts of the will left after that are efficacious in grace, not because of any independent act of the will (nor even independent non-resistance) on the part of the individual person, but because God already willed the cooperation in step 1 prior to any other considerations.
Well, I've probably just confused things for many of you more than clarified them, but hopefully it will at least help people consider these issues.
Again to oversimplify: the strict Thomists (including, apparently, Garrigou-Lagrange) seem to view mankind as the "massa damnata" and basically turn "free will" into something of an illusion, with efficacious grace being basically an arbitrary gift to a chosen few, and merely sufficient being basically just a technicality so that we don't have to turn God into some sort of monster. Whereas the Molinists are required to turn to complex appeals to God's "scientia media" (His knowledge of what someone would choose if put in certain circumstances) in order to deny efficacious grace to those who "would reject it anyway" in order to save the claim that it is infallible. Again, neither solution is terribly satisfying.
However, the "subtractive" method of Fr. Most helps to explain the relationship between sufficient grace and efficacious grace, and the relation of both to free will.
The idea had long been mentioned that efficacious grace is simply sufficient grace cooperated with or non-resisted, that efficacious grace is simply the name for sufficient grace that has been enacted. However, the problem is that cooperation itself has to also be attributed to God's agency. Even non-resistance to grace would have to be a grace, which for a long time seemed to merely move the causation back a step (ie, "turtles all the way down"). Now, for a merely objectively naturally morally good action, grace would not be needed, but for it to be of any salutary effect for the soul subjectively, God's supernatural agency must be present.
However, if sufficient grace is identified with the ability to non-resist, then things seem rather reconciled. Fallen humanity, without grace, is basically a massa damnata which can only resist God, its natural "default" is resistance. But, God gives everyone sufficient grace, changing their default, in practice, to non-resistance (but only due to sufficient grace). Then, if people still make an active choice to resist (which they are free to) then they sin, or at least do not enact the grace (ie, an "imperfection"). Whereas, if they do not make such an active choice to resist, then the grace (now coinciding with the free act of the will) is efficacious and so infallibly achieves its result, directing the will in a salutary direction while giving God all the agency (since even the non-resistance was a grace: the "sufficient grace" preceding the free act of the will).
Basically, it's the same principle as the predestination: merit is unconditional (everyone is given sufficient grace freely by God prior to any consideration of their own choice), whereas sin and imperfection is conditional on active resistance, on active rejection of that grace.
Basically, it is an application of the principles of election and reprobation to each individual act of the will. Rather than just considering the final eternal destination of all people, this applies it to each individual act. For God not only arranges or predestines the final destination as regards salvation for each person, but also each act of the will along the way, and yet leaving freedom just as meaningfully real.
And, once again, the best solution is a "subtractive" one; namely, God first wills every act of the will ever made by any person to be a salutary one as the default, a cooperation with His actual grace, and demonstrates this by giving everyone the sufficient grace to accomplish it; making the default of their will non-resistance to His. But then He excludes those acts where there is active resistance nevertheless. Those acts of the will left after that are efficacious in grace, not because of any independent act of the will (nor even independent non-resistance) on the part of the individual person, but because God already willed the cooperation in step 1 prior to any other considerations.
Well, I've probably just confused things for many of you more than clarified them, but hopefully it will at least help people consider these issues.
22 comments:
I'm inclined to agree with you by and large. This seems to me the only reasonable, Traditional position. Nothing will relieve all the tension of this mystery/paradox.
One thing that I think requires additional elucidation is the following:
"But, God gives everyone sufficient grace, changing their default, in practice, to non-resistance (but only due to sufficient grace)."
Everyone? Really? Even the non-baptized? Additionally, does he give sufficient grace to everyone in everything? How do the un-regenerated compare in this respect to the baptized?
The following dogmas seem applicable:
# God gives all the just sufficent grace (gratia proxime vel remote sufficiens) for the observation of the Divine Commandments. (De fide.)
# God gives all the faithful who are sinners sufficent grace (gratia saltem remote sufficiens) for conversion. (Sent. communis.)
# God gives all innocent unbelievers (infideles negativi) suffienct grace to achieve eternal salvation. (Sent. certa.)
Nothing is said of non-innocent non-believers, so I suppose you are technically free to believe that unbelieving sinners don't receive any grace.
But I see no reason to believe such a thing. I think God gives them the sufficient grace, they just reject it. But I think they are indeed made able to non-reject, and so may do so by the end of their life, we can hope.
The position whereby God simply doesn't give sinners, or at least non-Christian sinners, even the potential to start conversion, and leaves them in a situation where it is impossible to turn things around...seems Calvinistically cruel.
Of course, those not in a state of sanctifying grace cannot merit strictly speaking, but:
# The sinner can and must prepare himself by the help of actual grace for the reception of the grace by which he is justified. (De fide.)
Sufficient grace and Efficacious grace are Actual Grace (ie, supernatural interventions of God in the faculties of the soul, specifically the Will), not habitual or Sanctifying Grace which is a state or relationship.
Actual Graces can exist in those who are not in a state of sanctifying grace and, in fact, actual grace is necessary in order to gain or restore sanctifying grace in the first place (for those in possession of Reason at least.)
For example, going to confession is the result of efficacious grace. I firmly believe all sinners (believers or not) are given the sufficient grace to repent, but some choose to actively resist that, even though the sufficient grace empowers them to non-resist and to allow the grace to become efficacious in them. But some choose to reject the gift of that opportunity nonetheless (and it must be remembered that we are primarily talking about an INTERNAL opportunity).
I'm happy with the response. Reading this at work I was a little distracted. I've had some time to ponder things though, and I think your response is satisfying. In being critical of what you wrote I was also being critical of myself, you should know. Lately I've been accused by Scripture and even, funnily enough, Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as the Second Council of Orange of a dormant Semi-Pelagianism within myself. Maybe I'm wrong, and I was just very disorganized or unspecific in my terminology. I really do believe that grace is everywhere, which restores as a default our ability, before baptism, to will and do good though not without the grace of God. This is how conversion is personal, and a decision of the will as much as it is a free gift.
Yes, because even our ability to make that decision (to non-resist) is a grace, is granted by God as a totally free gift prior to any consideration of our choice (ie, Sufficient Grace)
It has been some time since I read Fr Most's thoughts on these matters, but I found them wanting. My opinion has not changed. I do think, however, that you have rendered a faithful summary of his thought.
1. It cannot be said that Gods' will is efficacious unless it is rejected by a human will. The Divine Will is efficacious in itself. It is not made efficacious by human assent.
2. Calvinism is generally considered to have negative (not positive) predestination for the reprobate. This is because predestination concerns grace.
3. I'm not sure what you're saying about the relationship of grace to a human free act. Grace is certainly necessary for any supernatural act by man (knowing, willing). It is not necessary for a natural free act.
4. You are certainly wrong that Thomists consider the free will to be an illusion. Grace perfects nature (including the will). The object of the will is the Good. Grace is a supernatural concept of the Good. Thus, the more grace given someone, the more that person is free.
5. As you note, the Jesuit (Molina) approach to these matters concerns the scientia media. Generally, this says that man does make God's will efficacious by accepting or rejecting Grace. God, however, outsmarts man: He knows that a man will reject it, so He doesn't offer it. IMHO, this borders on Pelagianism.
6. I think you have concentrated much too much on actual grace, which of course is not found in St Thomas. IMHO, the distinction between habitual and actual grace is virtual.
7. The Dominican understanding of the mystery of Grace centers on Predestination. Though God wills the salvation of all (universal salvific will--and sufficient gracce), not all are saved. Thus the aging Garrigou would say that if he had it to do all over again, he would have concentrated on the terrifying mystery of Grace.
On the other hand, the Jesuit approach centers on the relationship between the human will and God. IMHO, this too much equalizes the primary of the role of the human will in salvation and reprobation.
"1. It cannot be said that Gods' will is efficacious unless it is rejected by a human will. The Divine Will is efficacious in itself. It is not made efficacious by human assent."
But there is a different between "unless" and "if."
The point of Fr Most's theory is that, as he puts it, non-resistance is a "metaphysical zero" on the part of the human agent (http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/MOSTSOLV.HTM) He would not consider non-resistance to be positive "assent," and neither would I. Especially when even the non-resistance itself is made possible only by [sufficient] grace.
I think he'd also say that the Thomists have gotten hung-up on the idea of efficacious grace being efficacious by nature. As if that means there can be no other considerations by God if God so desires. That they have an impossibly strict notion of "unconditional."
Fr Most would probably say that "efficacious grace" is simply the NAME for sufficient grace that isn't resisted. For sufficient grace that God foresees won't be resisted and thus wills (due to the default already established in Step 1) to be efficacious. That the distinction between efficacious and sufficient is virtual.
If I determine to drive a straight line from A to B...I am the agent of that decision, even if I will swerve to avoid someone who jumps in the road if that happens. But, if it doesn't happen, it would be silly to say that I drove straight from A to B "because no one jumped in the road" or to attribute any sort of agency to anyone but me.
Something can be positively unconditional (ie, not conditional on anything happening), but I'd argue it is a logical impossibility for anything to be negatively unconditional (ie, not conditional on anything not-happening).
My decision to sit here and type this may not be conditional on anything else positively happening, but it is definitely conditional on an infinite number of things NOT happening (including me not having a heart attack, the roof not collapsing, etc). That will be true for any act, even of God (something happening always depends on the opposite NOT happening; that's just the principle of non-contradiction) But non-happening is a non-act.
"2. Calvinism is generally considered to have negative (not positive) predestination for the reprobate. This is because predestination concerns grace."
I guess that makes Calvinism a little better. But, as I said, the negative and positive distinction is little good in practice ("depriving of grace" is equivalent to damning), and I think there are definitely some Calvinists who think that the choice by God is primarily of final destination first, then grace to achieve it (or not) later.
"3. I'm not sure what you're saying about the relationship of grace to a human free act. Grace is certainly necessary for any supernatural act by man (knowing, willing). It is not necessary for a natural free act."
True. But "natural free acts" are not (or shouldn't be) considered relevant when it comes to the question of salvation and merit or anything that is going to affect them.
"4. You are certainly wrong that Thomists consider the free will to be an illusion. Grace perfects nature (including the will). The object of the will is the Good. Grace is a supernatural concept of the Good. Thus, the more grace given someone, the more that person is free."
I said Fr Most says the Thomists like LaGrange consider it basically only as good as an illusion. And if efficacious grace basically "forces" the will, then talk of "choice" is more ambiguous.
I think we'd all agree with what you say about grace making someone more free, though. That's the point about sufficient grace being what enables non-resistance in the first place. Without it, someone could only choose to resist. With it, people are able to non-resist, or resist, which is obviously being more free.
"5. As you note, the Jesuit (Molina) approach to these matters concerns the scientia media. Generally, this says that man does make God's will efficacious by accepting or rejecting Grace. God, however, outsmarts man: He knows that a man will reject it, so He doesn't offer it. IMHO, this borders on Pelagianism."
It's definitely not a satisfying solution.
Why I like Fr Most's solution is because it clearly distinguishes between mere "non-rejection" and a more positive idea of "acceptance" or "assent." It also makes, in it's "subtractive" logic of the order of divine decrees...the presence of grace unconditional, but the privation conditional.
"6. I think you have concentrated much too much on actual grace, which of course is not found in St Thomas. IMHO, the distinction between habitual and actual grace is virtual."
Yes, but it's a useful distinction practically. Because not everyone is in the State of Sanctifying Grace...yet everyone has sufficient (actual) grace, and those not in a State of Sanctifying grace "prepare for it" by responding to actual grace, though as the terms imply, the distinction is like that between act and habit; doing acts make them into a habit.
1. You didn't see the point of Calvinism, which endorses negative Predestination. The universal salvific will of God prevents such a concept.
2. I don't think your (and Fr Most's) understanding of the relationship between the Divine and Human wills is adequate.
a. St Thomas maintains that God moves the human will both as its agent and as its end. Generally, non-Thomists don't acknowledge both, and usually only the former (as most of Fr Most's generation did).
b. The Most concept of non resistance makes no sense. The will is moved by the presence of grace, which attracts it as its proper object, causing it to move. Thus, the notions of non resistance and "force" (even metaphorical) have no part in the discussion.
3. If Fr Most said that Garrigou LaGrange thought of free will as a useful illusion, then Fr Most simply did not understand the concept. As I noted previously, grace perfects free will.
BTW, Fr LaGrange (Marie Joseph op) was the founder of L'Ecole Biblique in Jerusalem. Fr Garrigou LaGrange (or sometimes just Garrigou) was the well known theologian who taught at my alma mater the Angelicum
You wrote: "Yes, but it's a useful distinction practically. Because not everyone is in the State of Sanctifying Grace...yet everyone has sufficient (actual) grace"
IMHO, the concept of sufficient grace more likely refers to gratia gratum faciens (sanctifying or habitual grace) than to actual grace.
"Attraction" can just as easily be resisted or non-resisted as a positive "force"
Fr Most's solution seems to maintain God as both the agent and the end in the will's supernaturally good acts, while leaving only the will itself as the cause of its own resistance and sin.
If you want to speak of attraction fine.
Let's say grace is like a magnet, then? It gives the will something to be pulled towards, but the will is free to not move as well. The distinction between sufficient and efficacious is virtual, just the difference between potential and actualized.
Perhaps we could imagine people as having big magnets strapped to their backs, walking around earth. They cannot fly on their own. No amount of arm-flapping will accomplish it. Only the Big Magnet in the Sky coming down and pulling at them (and it will necessarily pull at ALL of them) can make them rise. And yet, some people might still choose to grab onto trees, or tie themselves down, or put stones on their feet, etc. In these people, the magnetic field is still present, but it's potential is simply not actualized, and it's their own fault for clinging to other things.
This also leaves the more Thomistic possibility (though I find it arbitrary) that there is a difference in how intensely it acts on different people; people "father away" from the center of the Big Magnet might be pulled less strongly and have an easier time resisting than people right beneath it...but we would always have to maintain that it is strong enough to pull anyone if they do not resist it, yet not strong enough to force anyone who really does resist with all their effort.
Without the Big Magnet, the will could only not move (since it can't move on its own towards God) so the grace indeed gives it more degrees of freedom. If it moves, only the magnet can be credited, if it doesn't...only the stubborn will can be credited.
"but we would always have to maintain that it is strong enough to pull anyone if they do not resist it, yet not strong enough to force anyone who really does resist with all their effort."
Incorrect.
Combine God's omnipotence with the fact that grace perfects freedom, and it is easy to see that if God wants to give someone so much grace (and we know that some receive more grace than others do), the human will cannot help but be attracted. As we said, such a situation perfects human freedom--it does not violate it with "force".
"If it moves, only the magnet can be credited, if it doesn't...only the stubborn will can be credited."
When iron filings are moved by a magnet, they actually do move. The same is true of the will, which is a rational faculty. When it is moved by its proper end, the will is actually credited. Such is simply the relation between an agent and and end.
The difference is that the will is free not to move. Thus, when God attracts the will (cf grace), both God and the will are credited. When the will does not move, it is solely to blame.
"Combine God's omnipotence with the fact that grace perfects freedom, and it is easy to see that if God wants to give someone so much grace (and we know that some receive more grace than others do), the human will cannot help but be attracted."
Well, sure, God COULD overwhelm a Will with His omnipotence...but we're talking about how the process of salvation works generally. Such a circumstances I can only believe would be extremely extraordinary.
Also, if some people receive more grace than others, this is not arbitrary or a whim on God's part. It is because they initially got the same sufficient grace that everyone starts with, but didn't resist it, and so got pulled closer to the "center" of the Big Magnet. The closer you are to the center, the harder and harder it gets to resists (but, generally, not impossible), and the more and more "accelerated" your ascent becomes.
"Thus, when God attracts the will (cf grace), both God and the will are credited. When the will does not move, it is solely to blame."
In the sense that we are said to Merit when grace moves us, I agree. But the point is that the movement requires that external agent, that prime mover, it cannot move on its own, the merit cannot be attributed to anything the Will could do on its own.
"In the sense that we are said to Merit when grace moves us, I agree. But the point is that the movement requires that external agent, that prime mover, it cannot move on its own, the merit cannot be attributed to anything the Will could do on its own."
It is true with or without merit. When God moves the human will as its end, the action of grace on the will causes voluntary movement, enhancing free will.
Also: Because the First Cause is infinite and omnipotent, it always overwhelms EVERY subsequent cause.
Yes, but this is where people start to get slippery. As you said, the will is free not to move. There is a sense in which God could remove that freedom to reject, but we don't believe he generally does.
No, there is no sense in which God removes that freedom. God made man free--it would be unGodly for Him to remove that freedom.
As I noted earlier, grace perfects freedom--it does not remove it.
I think I know what you're saying, but we have to be careful as the problem is that a lot of people see that as simply contrived and pedantic. As simply being a clever redefinition of "freedom" without being meaningfully "free" in the common understanding.
When you say it "cannot help" but be attracted given a certain amount of grace...many people would not see that as meaningfully free, unless you make a distinction between "attraction" (potential) and the actual movement towards the thing attractive.
"Cannot help" and "free" are not compatible to many people and attempts to make them that way seem disingenuous. There is a way they can be, but one must be very careful. The Thomists have ended up often just confusing a lot of people with what sound like thought-terminating cliches, even though I believe there is a meaningful sense in which it can be true.
Let's return to the three-step proposal by Fr. Most.
I fail to see how this solves anything. In order to get from 1 to 2, a sinner has to fulfill the condition of resistance. Yet, to get from 1 to 3, the sinner has to fulfill the condition of non-resistance. They have to be good enough not to resist. Put another way, what has to logically occur to get to step 3? A proposition for step 2 might look like this: "If step 1 + active resistance, then step 2." Yet both of the following propositions are denied for step 3:
"If step 1 + active good (i.e. merit), then step 3"
"If step 1 + non-resistance, then step 3"
But what other options are there? If doing good and doing nothing are not causative unto step 3, and doing bad is causative unto step 2, then how does one move from 1 to 3?
Even if you want to say that non-resistance is a "metaphysical zero" -- and what does that mean anyway? Is salvation a process of sitting as still as possible? -- it is still clearly a *condition* that must be fulfilled to get from 1 to 3. For if it were not a necessary condition, but God's willing were the sole and sufficient condition, then God's willing the salvation of all would effect salvation for all.
To say that the elect of step 3 are there because of step 1 in the same way that the letters on the chalkboard exist because they were first written there is simply to say that God's grace is *necessary* unto salvation. It does not explain sufficiency.
You say that even cooperation with grace is itself a grace, but this does not assuage the problem at all: for, such "cooperative grace" is either sufficient or insufficient unto cooperation. If it be sufficient, then all recipients will cooperate; if not, then another condition is necessary. It is false that all recipients will cooperate, but then you're stuck with conditionality.
Could we dare think that the reason this "mystery" is so hard to solve is because it is a flaming contradiction?
"Yet, to get from 1 to 3, the sinner has to fulfill the condition of non-resistance."
But non-resistance is the default ALREADY given by God in step 1. So it is not an act (nor even a non-act) attributable to the person's own will without God.
"They have to be good enough not to resist."
Again, everyone is given the possibility, the default in fact...of non-resistance only by God, prior to any consideration of the person's actions, in step 1.
As I described it, salvation is a question of "unless" not of "if"...
" 'If step 1 + non-resistance, then step 3' "
No, that's the genius of Fr Most's solution; you don't need to add "+ non-resistance" to step 1, as step 1 already contains/is non-resistance as the default.
You are adding a zero. 5+1 = 6, of course. But 5=5, period, UNLESS you add the six. Adding a zero to the five to get five again is an unnecessary step, however. It's like saying "5 is 5 because no one added anything to it." Or like, "I'm here doing this, because I'm not doing every other thing possible." It's trivial.
"If doing good and doing nothing are not causative unto step 3, and doing bad is causative unto step 2, then how does one move from 1 to 3?"
Step 1 and 3 are the same, though, really, that's the whole point and genius of his solution. Step 1 is God's salvific will prior to any consideration of personal choice, Step 3 is merely salvation as God willed. It is only UNLESS someone rejects it that they lose it.
The point about excluding "doing nothing" is merely to ensure that we don't say that non-resistance is the cause of God giving the grace. As the non-resistance is, in fact, itself a grace.
You seem to have a very strange notion of "causative." God makes us clean. If I jump in the mud again, obviously I will become dirty because of that and it will be my own fault. But, otherwise, can you really say that my non-jumping-in-the-mud is the "cause" of my cleanliness, either my original cleanliness or my continued cleanliness??
No, that would be absurd. Just as it would be absurd to say that the cause of me writing this is "because I'm not making pancakes" or that the cause of me being 21 is because I am not every other possible age.
Non-things cannot be causes in any meaningful sense. The fact of not doing something else is not the "cause" of me doing what I am doing.
"Is salvation a process of sitting as still as possible? -- it is still clearly a *condition* that must be fulfilled to get from 1 to 3."
Condition, maybe, I don't know. It isn't a "cause" though. But if a "condition"...that is an extremely trivial point. Like saying that my sitting in this room is conditional on me not being in any other room in the whole world. Well, duh, but that's just the property of identity.
"For if it were not a necessary condition, but God's willing were the sole and sufficient condition, then God's willing the salvation of all would effect salvation for all."
No more than me placing some children in a room guarantees that they'll stay in the room. Some might walk out while I'm gone, and that was caused by them.
But the fact that the other children are in the room when I get back...isn't "because of their not walking away" because non-actions are not causes. The reason those children are in the room, is because I put them there in the first place!
It would be absurd to answer the question, "Why are these children in the room?" with "Because they didn't leave." Non-things cannot be causes. Why are they in the room? Because I put them there. Though "why are those other children not in the room?" can be perfectly well answered with, "because they left."
"If it be sufficient, then all recipients will cooperate; if not, then another condition is necessary. It is false that all recipients will cooperate, but then you're stuck with conditionality."
Sufficient, in Catholic theology, is not the same as efficacious. Sufficient means you're being given a chance, totally gratuitously, an opportunity you could never have on your own.
There is a high plateau of salvation that no one can climb by human power. God takes all mankind and puts them on top, where they could never have gotten on their own.
This is a sufficient grace. It is totally sufficient to save you: you are placed on the very plateau of salvation!
But that doesn't mean you can't still throw yourself off. If you do, it's your fault. If you don't, however, it is trivial to say, "You're on top of the plateau because you didn't throw yourself off." No, the CAUSE of your being there is God placing you there.
Saying it is "conditional" on you not throwing yourself off is as trivial as saying that a pencil being yellow is conditional on it not being every other possible color.
It's as trivial as saying that I am tall "because I haven't cut my legs off" as if I can claim any of the glory of my tallness (which belongs to God, or at least to my parents) merely because I haven't done anything to ruin it.
But negatives are non-things, the pencil is not yellow "because it is not blue." It is yellow because someone painted it yellow. I am tall because of my genes and childhood nutrition, not because I haven't mutilated myself.
Only positive acts can be causes. Every other possibility not-happening is not the cause of the happening of the one that does.
I have three main points of dispute:
(1) Conditionality
You said: //Condition, maybe, I don't know. It isn't a "cause" though. But if a "condition"...that is an extremely trivial point. Like saying that my sitting in this room is conditional on me not being in any other room in the whole world. Well, duh, but that's just the property of identity.//
No, you're confusing the issue. If you *presently* are in a room, then it would indeed be nothing but a logical description to say that you are *presently* not in other rooms. But if you say that, in the *future*, you will be in this room, then it is meaningful to say that one condition of that is that you not depart for other rooms.
And if conditionality is genuine, then the whole enterprise -- to reconcile unconditional election with conditional reprobation -- is overturned.
(2) The cause of "step 3"
You said: //But the fact that the other children are in the room when I get back...isn't "because of their not walking away" because non-actions are not causes. The reason those children are in the room, is because I put them there in the first place!//
First, assuming the potential decision crossed the children's minds, it was indeed a *decision* for them to stay there. Applying this analogy to salvation, unless you believe that the elect are never, ever faced with the decision to apostatize, you must say that the elect *decide* not to "leave the room." (And why would you say that the life of the elect is filled by continuous non-action? Such a doctrine is absolutely averse to reality.) So even if you want to say that the children's not leaving is a non-cause, you must say that their decision not to leave has ontological status. (And if you want to utilize an analogy that does not involve a decision, then your analogy would not be explaining any meaningful soteriology.)
Second, depending on what's being asked, it can be appropriate to state many different causal aspects of the scenario. It is not false to say that the children are in the room because they're not out of the room; nor is it false to say that the children are in the room because the humans in the room are of sufficient age to be considered *children* rather than adults; nor is it false to say that the children are in the room because they've received enough food to be alive and living in the room; nor is it false to say that the children are in the room because they weren't just magically teleported to another planet seconds earlier.
What I'm getting at is this: among all the various causal factors that can be listed for an event, some may seem very *insignificant* and not nearly as *necessary* as some other causes, but it does not follow that they are *nonexistent*. To say that the kids are in the room because you put them there is to state the most significant cause. To say that the elect are in step 3 because God put them there in step 1 is to state a significant and necessary cause, but it does not follow that no conditions were fulfilled to move from 1 to 3.
It is still the case that the elect have to choose not to apostatize given the option, which is certainly a condition they fulfill.
(3) "Unless" is a modification of the operator "if." [P unless Q] = [If ~Q then P] Therefore your category of "subtractive predestination" is not really a new category at all.
Peace,
Ben
"But if you say that, in the *future*, you will be in this room, then it is meaningful to say that one condition of that is that you not depart for other rooms."
There is no past and future in the eternal decrees of God.
And I still don't believe it is meaningful to say that my non-departure from the room is a condition of my being here, because non-departure is non-thing, a non-action.
"Applying this analogy to salvation, unless you believe that the elect are never, ever faced with the decision to apostatize, you must say that the elect *decide* not to leave the room.'"
But the question of predestination applies not only to the final question of election or reprobation, but also each individual act of the will.
People do face such decisions, and merit by rejecting the temptation...but the truth is that their rejection of such a temptation (and thus gaining of merit) is, likewise, the "default" given them, prior to any decision of theirs, by God in the first place as a sufficient grace. And sufficient grace is efficacious unless resisted.
So, again, even in the case of the individual decision, it works the same way. They could decide to resist God's grace and thus give into the temptation, and that would be entirely their fault. But, unless they do that, it is really God's grace working in them prior to any consideration of any acts on their part.
If I'm on a conveyer belt, I can choose to jump off. But if I don't, my movement is attributable only to the belt. You can't say I am causing my motion by "not jumping off".
"And why would you say that the life of the elect is filled by continuous non-action?"
The Saints are, in the final causation, passive to grace. When they act (and they do) their will is moved by grace, this is the "co-operation" of their will with grace. But any meritorious actions are ultimately to be attributed to God acting IN us, not to any act of our own.
"It is not false to say that the children are in the room because they're not out of the room"
We're talking about a realist notion of causality, here. Because means caused-by. Non-entities and merely hypothetical actions don't cause anything.
"it does not follow that no conditions were fulfilled to move from 1 to 3."
Again, I think that's like saying 5 is still 5 because no one added anything to it. It's a metaphysical zero.
"It is still the case that the elect have to choose not to apostatize given the option, which is certainly a condition they fulfill."
Like I said, they don't choose of their own power in any sort of pelagian or semi-pelagian way because the principle applies not just to salvation in general, but to each and every free human choice.
There is grace before any decision on the part of a person, and so to it alone can be attributed the final causation of any meritorious action (while to the person alone can be attributed a sinful action) though, by non-resisting, the will "co-operates" as the default, and the merit accrues to the person.
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